PROLOGUE

New East Asia: New Media Images, New Nationalisms

Tianwei Ren

... it is now clearer that the central event of the last century for the majority of the world’s population was the intellectual and political awakening of Asia and its emergence from the ruins of both Asian and European empires.  

The rise of Asia, and the assertiveness of Asian peoples, consummates their revolt against the West that began more than a century ago; it is in many ways the revenge of the East.  

The twenty-first century is increasingly ‘The Asian Century’. It is time to remove the Eurocentric lens through which much of recent world history has been viewed.

East Asia is home to some of the world’s most dramatic changes since the end of World War II. This is an evolving process. Meteoric developments in regional economic, social re-construction and cultural rejuvenation make it a formidable, modern player on the world stage. As Pankaj Mishra has said, the Rise constitutes ‘Asian revanchism’. East Asia has challenged and now freed itself from western domination and a subordinate role in a world system build by the Western powers. The ‘secrets of Western power’ – the ability ‘to assimilate modern ideas, techniques and institutions’ with regard to East Asia, have been badly underestimated on the part of the West. Hence the surprise, shock and even fear brought about by the region’s dynamic growth. Consequently, the region is now under the Western World’s watchful, apprehensive gaze.

Within East Asia, political relations are complex and dynamic as are all international relationships. However, a core feature of intra-region politics, especially with

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2 Ibid., 305.
4 Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 305.
5 Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire, 8.
regard to strategic insecurity and diplomatic belligerence, lies in the nationalistic tensions generated to a large extent from historical issues. Debates over long disputed territories, history textbooks, attitudes towards past wars and claims of historical legacies entwine and create unique tensions in the region.

The three main fast-rising countries; China, Japan, South Korea, have their own distinctive national features and achievements. In particular, China became the second-largest economic force in the world at the end of the first decade of the new millennium\(^6\) and the leading economy just four years later\(^7\) – yet ironically, the country was not yet deemed as a principal agent of the regional rise, in 1997 when *The Rise of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century*\(^8\) was published. Economic changes led to shifts in global political influence and cultural self-awareness and confidence. China is obsessed with history, and history is the nation’s motivation, burden, olive branch and weapon. It has begun seeking dominant geopolitical roles. In a recent state-promoted documentary series: *Major-Country Diplomacy*\(^9\), President Xi Jinping’s declamation represented the nation’s confidence and ambition: ‘The world is vast. Its problems are many. The global community, in solving these problems, is looking to China’.\(^10\) It now poses not just as an East Asian, but a global power. Japan, with national perspicacity, on the other hand, was the first modern post-war country in the East to eschew western colonial domination. It aimed to imitate the West but in its own image. After the Second World War, it concentrated on economic growth with notable success, allowing it to recover swiftly from war ruin and global rejection and re-enter world society. In this the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games was certainly an important catalyst caught and projected world-wide by the global media. Though a relatively small nation in physical size, the country remained the second largest global economy for 22 years until 1978 when China surpassed it. Because of Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic past connected with brutal regional invasions and colonisation, it remains disliked and mistrusted by its neighbours. Witnessing China’s rise Japan is now on all fronts anxious to urgently restore its

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\(^9\) Major-Country Diplomacy is a six-episode political documentary, jointly produced by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV). It started to be broadcasted from 28 August 2017.

\(^10\) These are opening quotations from Xi Jinping of the Major-Country Diplomacy.
The Nationalist Construction of Chinese Olympians: Media, Change, Reform

Richard Xiaoqian Hu and Junjian Liang

The essay investigates the relationship between the Chinese nationalism and modern sport, which was introduced to China at the end of the 19th century, through looking at the nationalist accounts in the construction of Chinese athletes in the Olympic Games, particularly after Beijing was awarded its first Olympic Games in 2001. It examines the two-fold nature of the nationalist account. It argues that this is related to the political characteristics of the concept of Chinese nationalism under the communist regime. The essay also investigates the relationship between elite sport performance, which is highly emphasised within the Chinese elite sport system, and the portraits of Chinese Olympians. It concludes by demonstrating the consistency of the nationalist account and its political significance in discussions concerning Chinese elite athletes, and it contrasts this with the changes in media portraits of sports heroes after the Beijing Games. The relationship between these changes and the reform of the Chinese elite sport system is briefly discussed in the conclusion.

Sport is assigned various roles and functions in modern society, for example as a ‘peacemaker’ and catalyst at global, local and individual levels on the one hand; but on the other hand, it is also known famously as ‘war minus shooting’. It also, on occasion, may lead to, or provoke, conflict and confrontation between nations and states. This is also true for the Olympics, which encourages universalism, but also facilitates opportunities to promote nationalism. With the five-ringed flag flying high above the stadium, spectators demonstrate their national pride through the waving of national flags or painting their faces in national colours, and countries realise political objectives, such as to establish and to reinforce their national identities

(or sometimes to show disapproval of others) as is true, of course, of sport generally.\textsuperscript{5}  

It is stated by Hoberman that ‘sporting nationalism is not a single generic phenomenon; on the contrary, it is a complicated socio-political response to challenges and events, both sportive and non-sportive, that must be understood in terms of the varying national contexts in which it appears’.\textsuperscript{6} This essay looks at the nationalist construction of Chinese athletes, particularly those who are identified and portrayed as national heroes in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The nationalist narrative regarding sport, i.e. sport as a means and an embodiment of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, has been a vital element of Olympic discourse in Chinese society since modern sport was introduced to China in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The PRC, established in 1949, has inherited the nationalist connotation of elite sport in Chinese society while blending additional features into Chinese Olympic discourse, particularly those concerning the Olympic performance of Chinese athletes. In line with the traditional accentuation of success in Chinese society and the emphasis on elite sport performance in the Chinese elite sport system, successful Olympic athletes are recognised and portrayed as heroes of both the Chinese nation and the communist regime. Following China’s unprecedented successes in 2008 and in 2012 in the Olympic Games, the nation has witnessed a dramatic boost in the number of Chinese Olympic heroes but also subtle changes in the construction of the Chinese sports heroes.

\textbf{Chinese Nationalism and Chinese Modern Sport}

\textit{The Modern Era: Chinese Nationalism}

Modern Chinese nationalism is closely associated with the suffering and the survival of the Chinese nation during its century of humiliation. As chanted in the National Anthem of the PRC, i.e. \textit{the March of the Volunteers}, ‘the Chinese nation faces its greatest peril’\textsuperscript{7} during those years from the First Opium War in 1840 to the establishment of the communist regime in 1949.


\textsuperscript{7} Translated by authors.
National peril resulted in a great nationalist question confronting Chinese social elites for more than a century and inherited by the People’s Republic of China (PRC): ‘how to release China from its past suffering and establish a great independent nation in a Western-dominant international system that centred on the nation-state as the primary unit of political organisation?’

At this time, the country also faced the challenging objective of national restoration; the identification of a unified Chinese nation was the first task for the PRC. China, unlike modern nation-states in the West, was, and still is, a diverse and multi-ethnic society based on general cultural principles. Hence, the construction of a concept of the Chinese nation, which could not only unite ethnic minorities but also affiliate the country with the nation-state concept advocated by the West, became the first step of the PRC’s great mission of national rejuvenation.

Ascribing China’s century-long dark age as a consequence of both the collapse of the corrupted feudal dynasty and the invasion of the imperialist West, the Chinese leaders employed the communist ideology, particularly, the concept of ‘revolutionary classes’ as the main criterion to redefine, or to construct anew, the concept of the Chinese people domestically. In addition, the international political climate during the Cold War, which overlapped with the early stages of the PRC, and the threatening of a counter attack from the Nationalist Government in Taiwan considerably enhanced the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal narrative of the communist regime in theorising the notion of a Chinese nation, who were, for instance, under the oppression from ‘three mountains’, i.e. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism.

Besides the political criteria, the concept of the Chinese nation, or Zhonghua Minzu in Chinese, is also constructed via cultural features, such as a single Chinese civilisation throughout history, the assimilation of various ethnic groups into a unified Chinese society with a diverse culture, particularly during the great and powerful ancient dynasties, such as the Han Dynasty (BC202-220), the Tang Dynasty (618-907), the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). Moreover, along with the protection of the written and spoken language of ethnic minority groups in the PRC, the promotion of Mandarin via the education system throughout the country by both the PRC and the Republic of China (hereafter the ROC) (the Nationalist Government which fled to Taiwan in 1949) also reinforced the cultural unification of the Chinese nation.

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10 Lewis and Teets, ‘China’.
A Special Salience: Media, Iconography, Nationalism: Modern Chinese Olympic Games and Heroes as Soft Power ‘Projectiles’

Tianwei Ren

Sport is represented, of course, dramatically in the modern media in a variety of forms – sports news, performers bios, live broadcasts, and feature stories, are some of the potent instruments for presenting the theatre of modern sport celebrating performers, performances and recording moments for posterity. And then there is the cartoon as a simplified and symbolic media medium with its skillful reductionism: unique in presenting heroism and glory, icons and patriots. Arguably, the global Olympics offer opportunities for cartoon depiction of special salience for arousing patriotic, even chauvinistic, sentiment, projecting national iconic athletic heroes and bonding nations. This essay will consider cartoon portraits in the Chinese media of Chinese athletes during the Beijing Olympics and the following years as ‘projectiles’ of a proud nationalism, a resuscitated nation and political symbols of a New China using soft power to stride confidently to the centre of the world stage. The establishment of international esteem and the pursuit of national solidarity were willingly assumed responsibilities of the Chinese media. The sports cartoon was powerful, constructive and incisive in presenting nationalistic, iconographic images in human form of ‘The Middle Kingdom’ reborn in a new political idiom.

Introduction: Cartoon, Sport, and Nationalism: A Political Perspective

Visual images have become part of everyday discourse. Visual rhetoric and has contributed significantly to our current knowledge of the world; this is especially true in a world of politics replete with images. ‘Visual practice is ... emerging as an important, and unjustifiably neglected, aspect of political communication research’. It has a powerful influence on contemporary international politics. As Edwards and Ware have said, “In a political environment dominated by the spectacle, political symbols that have a particularly visual orientation should be first-order objects of

study”.

The cartoon is an effective instrument of political and social commentary worldwide. It employs a bold, figurative reductionism that serves the purpose of not only interpreting and framing political discourse but offering symbolic constructions of political and national identities. It is value-laden. It is not intended to be fair, balanced or objective. Political agendas can be pointedly transmitted via simplified imagery. Their essence is often satire. Thus not infrequently it serves as sharp political criticism. The political cartoon can be a simplified, exaggerated or distorted representation of political reality intended to serve the cause of ‘truth’.

Sport, as Mangan has noted, is ‘played globally, organised globally, commercialised globally, politicised globally and, ... enjoyed globally – whatever the local variations, interpretations and nuances – resulted in sport-obsessed global societies with common “play”, pleasures and purposes’. It is a world obsession. At the same time, sport is also frequently ‘localised’, particularised and ‘nationalistic’ in purpose. Sport as a modern experience is ‘an institution in which intense forms of nationalistic emotion are generated’. It is often inseparable from national identity. Not only is sport is of considerable modern national significance; it is a contemporary form of nationalism: sports nationalism

Sports nationalism is a ‘complex social phenomena created by ties between a nation–state and its sports’. This kind of nationalism, argues Hoberman,
By means of an analysis of the political significance of China’s involvement in modern Olympic Games, this essay argues that sport plays an integral role in Chinese nationalism and the media plays a vital role in the projection of nationalism in sport. Sport is a fundamental aspect of national unity, soft power politics and diplomatic strategy. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, sport has become an inseparable part of Chinese nationalism, and the backbone of China’s foreign policy in modern times. China’s interest in the Olympics coincided with a search for a positive national identity and a commitment to internationalization. This essay discusses how the role of the media is critical in the projection of a modern Chinese nationalism.

Introduction: Modern Sport- More than ‘Just a Game’!

A young Australian with a Chinese background, who was working for the Beijing Olympics in China, wrote at the time, ‘I am disappointed that many Chinese people seem to have abandoned the Olympic spirit in the name of patriotism... they are claiming sole ownership of these Games as theirs alone, to organize as they please so they can prove how far they have come’.1 The Chinese government and popular nationalists have justified their sentiment as being sparked by international criticism over China’s policies, the young Australian was concerned that the nationalist sentiments came from ‘a place in which young people want not only to deconstruct the mainstream but fight it as well’.2

Over the last thirty years, Eric Dunning’s claim that ‘sport matters’3 has been widely accepted in social science scholarship.4 The innovative contribution of The International Journal of the History of Sport and the series Sport in the Global

Society inter alia has consolidated this claim. These emphatically seminal innovations, in particular, have advanced academic acceptance and have fittingly promoted modern sport’s impact in global economic, cultural and political analysis. This has established sport as a powerful facilitator, provider and resource for an ‘array of identities’. However, it certainly does not imply that sport should be understood as a ‘quasi autonomous [social] institution’ or a ‘kind of self-sufficient [...] sub-system’, but rather as a ‘constitutive element of everyday life and popular culture’ taking place ‘within a particular social and historical setting’. More than this, it is apparent to any intelligent analyst that modern sport is an integral component of contemporary politics and geopolitics. Now where is this more evident than in East Asia.

Nationalism is defined as individual’s loyalty and devotion to the specific nation state. Hobsbawm has argued that sport could be contextualised as a national struggle between nations, where national identities are continually shaped and reshaped by states, athletes and supporters. Through participating in international sports competitions, nations states can promote their self-images, enhance their international reputations and boost the morale of their people. Athletes’ performance hence signifies state power on ‘a level playing field’ (e.g. the Olympic Games). A national team’s success strengthens national prestige, pride and dignity. Thus national communities are deeply emotional when supporting their national teams. International sports competition is ‘more than just a game’: it is a matter of national pride.

Chinese nationalism has been expressed and observed in international sports competitions since the 1980s. Following Deng Xiaoping’s discourse ‘Improve the Level of Performance, Win Honour for the Country’; the Chinese government and its people believe that athletes’ excellent performance in Olympic Games could highlight the nation’s achievement alongside economic reform and state modernization. From then on, substantial resources have been invested in China’s sports development: sporting success was seen as an effective way to demonstrate China’s power at a global level. In light of the closer relationship between sport and nationalism, China’s Sports Ministry established the ‘Olympic Strategy’ with the aim to develop

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elite sport and transform China into a leading sports power. As He Zhenliang, Chairman of the IOC Commission for the Culture of Olympic Education stated, the most significant outcome of the Beijing Games will be ‘the elevation of our Chinese people’s self-confidence and sense of pride’. The elite sports system is, indeed, a top-down, tightly structured nationwide policy, which the top-level controlled and managed from the top to achieve Olympics medals. Local and regional sports commissions are responsible for talented youth selection and professional training. Under the elite sports system, despite the physical and psychological strain exerted, athletes are obligated to devote all their energy to earning glory for the country, which is arguably similar to the Soviet-style training system. The ‘Olympic Strategy’ and elite sports system, however, could not have succeeded without an intense Chinese nationalist spirit.

**Historical Overview of Chinese Nationalism from 1949 to 2008**

There is a need first of all to clarify briefly the origins of this intense Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism is of long standing: some scholars argue that nationalism was transformed by Confucianism in ancient China. Others argue that it originated in 1895 after the first Sino-Japan War and formed in an atmosphere of bitter anti-foreignism. I agree with the latter view because before 1895, the key elements of nation-state mentality and nationality were missing in China.

Prior to the war, the Chinese nation did not even have an official name or a national flag, let alone the elements of a nation-state. Liang Qichao, one of the most influential Chinese scholars and journalists at that time, wrote, ‘nothing makes me more ashamed than the fact that our nation has no name’, and ‘we Chinese had no

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15 Ibid.
Democracy through the Lens of Sports Journalism: Japan and the East Asian Olympic Games

Keiko Ikeda

This essay concentrates on the emergence of impartial sports journalism in early Nineteenth Century Britain by focusing on one of Britain’s first sport’s journalists, Pierce Egan, and his connection with radical journalism. This radicalism is contrasted with the birth of Japanese sports journalism and its evolution and relationship to current Japanese nationalism. Sport-journalism has been frequently implicated in bias associated with nationalistic emotion. Finally, sport journalism in recent and the coming world Olympic Games will be documented and analysed.

A Brief History of How and Why British Sports Journalism was Born

In the early 19th Century, Pierce Egan’s weekly reports on boxing were the earliest examples of sports journalism in the world. Dennis Brailsford in his social history of British sport, calls him ‘the virtual founder of the sporting press’, stating that his weekly reports ‘gave the sport report a most independent existence’.1 Egan coined the phrase, ‘One of the Fancy’, which became a key concept in the world of the sporting press. The phrase created a new space, where an internal world composed of ‘any person who is fond of a particular amusement, or closely attached to some subject’, in this case, ‘a sporting character’, could be a member.2 This new space, and concept, had the powerful attraction of labelling the Pre-Victorian sporting world. This term, ‘One of the Fancy’ also became synonymous with the birth of an early nineteenth century sporting press in Britain.

Egan’s weekly reports had the additional effect of creating arguments to defend popular sports against the critical who attacked pugilism as an unlawful, bloody sport. Studies of this period have indicated links between the early sporting press


and period radicalism and its assertion of the rights of common people. Arguments defending popular sport and popular radicalism were closely connected with the idea of ‘British Liberty’ itself, a product of the mythological component of the history of Romanticism. Early radicalism developed this concept of Romanticism from ideas born of the French Revolution and Benthamite theory. A summary of this development and associated studies can be found in Appendix 1.

My long-term studies on the British early sport journalism and its relation to social contexts can be summarized by the following perspectives:

**People connected with sports journalism in the early nineteenth century were:**

- Those who asked ‘who are the ordinary people?’ or ‘what are the rights of people?’

- Many of them were radical essayists, journalists and publishers such as William Cobbett, William Hazlitt and William Hone. Investigation of the rural culture of the lower class alerted them to the role of popular culture. They felt an obligation to defend popular sports, an obligation grounded in the theory of their early radical principle of ‘British Liberty’. ‘British Liberty’ was a key phrase in defending popular traditional customs, sports and pastimes.

- Radical essayists, William Cobbett, William Hazlitt and William Hone influenced the early sport-journalism of Pierce Egan.

**Verbalization of sporting matters, during 1820-1830:**

- In the late eighteenth century, in the light of major social changes such as urbanization, the need to write down the characteristics of traditional popular

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pastimes increased as well as the extent of changes. While there was an attempt to preserve them, many popular sports of the lower class were criticized and attacked for their brutality and immorality. Members of the upper middle-class felt lower class sports were immoral, impious and a threat to public order.

- Use of the phrase, ‘blood sports’ increased to distinguish them from the hunting of the upper class. Activities such as bull-running, bull-baiting, cockfighting and throwing at cocks, or bare-knuckle-fighting, mass football and other sports in rural festivals (such as wakes) became a target of criticism.

- In refuting this criticism, radical journalism promoted the existence of such sports in society by emphasizing their virtues. Radicals asserted that people had a right to sport. Sport, they argued, had social significance. The 1820s were the period when the weekly sporting paper appeared in the ‘cradle’ style.\(^6\)

*The role of sports journalism:*

- As a result, sport journalism of the early nineteenth century brought new aspects to the world of the press.

- Firstly, adopting slang, jargon, and coined words made ordinary people accustomed to the world of letters and as a result sports writing became independent. Using exclamation marks, capitals, and Italics to show slang or technical terms peculiar to sporting world helped the sporting atmosphere diffuse directly to the people who were not in the venue.

- Secondly, it was a characteristic of sport journalism that it mixed social classes and mixed broadsides with politically radical journalism. This prepared the way for the coming age of substantial popular journalism, established after the abolition of stamp duties (Stamp Act 1855), and the improvement of the printing technology which made daily newspapers possible.

- Thirdly, the notions such as ‘fair play’, ‘courage’, ‘chivalrous honour’, ‘devotion’, and ‘prowess’, thought to be peculiar to the sporting world, were described as a social code. Although still showing pre-modern taste and far from the modern essence of athletic sports, it was philosophically grounded in the significance of sports.\(^7\) This rhetoric of popular radicalism and sport jour-

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Media Representation Transformed: from Unconditional Affirmation to Critical Consideration: The Tokyo Olympics 1964 and 2020

Christian Tagsold

The National media was enthusiastic when Tokyo became the first Asian city to host an Olympic Games in 1964. This created both a nationalist and conservative outlook. The newspapers, radio and TV stations univocally depicted the Olympic Games as a rebirth of a war-ridden nation. Critical voices had no public forum for their opinions and thus remained without any detectable influence even though the Games were accompanied by a range of problems such as (forced) relocations of citizens and homeless people.

The campaign for 2020 depicts 1964 as an ideal Games which created a unified and vibrant nation. Both the Games and the state of the nation in 1964 are promoted as ideal exemplars for the upcoming Games and thus provide both a nationalist and conservative idealization of what Japan should look like. The task for the 2020 campaigners, however, is much more complicated today than it was half a century ago. Social media such as Twitter, Facebook and blogging platforms have become widespread and with them critical assessments of the upcoming Games. Even though after the triple catastrophe of March 2011 it became next to impossible to criticize the Games in the national media, the campaign has lost ground. The cost of the new Olympic stadium and allegations that the logo for the Games was plagiarized have opened up the flood gates for an outpouring of wide-spread discontent. In addition, the fate of the large numbers of homeless people living in public parks due to two decades of a struggling economy has been widely publicized in the social media as has been relocations and the exploding overall costs of the Games. It has become much easier than in 1964 to take note of these critical voices. As a consequence, the national media this time has not refrained from looking closely at the problems of 2020.

This essay will discuss the role of the Japanese media in the projection of the national (and international) image of the Olympics in 1964 and 2020. It will ask to what extent have new forms of social media become a powerful means of shaping this image over recent years, and to what extent the new media has influenced the classic media and given coverage for the first time to extensive discontent.
In Japan intense debates swirl around the upcoming 2020 Olympic Summer Games in Tokyo. Despite high expectations for the event, reports have alleged corruption and costs have skyrocketed. Against these concerns, accusations of plagiarism against the initial logo for the Games may seem a minor infraction, but it symbolizes the problems of hosting the games. In the fall of 2016 mainstream media outlets, such as the online magazine *Gendai bijinesu*, run by the large publisher Kōdansha, had started asking whether or not it would be appropriate to cancel the Olympic Games 2020 since they had been ‘based on a huge lie from the very start’.

As a historian of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, I was at first surprised by these developments. The 1964 games, the first ever held in Japan, were rarely criticized in public and media coverage depicted them as highly successful. At that time, as I show below, some newspapers doubted the economical and organizational ability of the city and the country to host the games, but its most serious problems never came to light. However, when one considers the anti-Olympic movements that have occurred since those first games, these new protests do find precedent. After the disaster of World War II, the 1964 Olympics symbolized the return of the country to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous nations, but in the late 1970s, when Nagoya tried to outbid Seoul for the 1988 winter games, the prospect of hosting the Olympic games held much less appeal. In the years after 1964, Japan had witnessed several environmental scandals, which led some citizens to doubt official politics and to become activists. Much later, while the International Olympic committee investigated bribery allegations in relation to Salt Lake City’s bid for the 2002 games, scandals came to light surrounding Nagano’s earlier, bid for the 1998 Winter Olympics, which

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1. Tokyo’s bidding committee impressed the International Olympic Committee with plans for a new Olympic stadium designed by the celebrated architect Zaha Hadid. In 2015 the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, citing costs, scrapped those plans and replaced it with a design by Japanese architect Kuma Kengo.

2. In 2015 a Belgian designer accused the designer of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic logo, Sano Kenjirō, of stealing the logo he had designed for the Théâtre de Liège. After initially denying the allegations, the organizing committee abandoned the original design in September 2015 and announced a new one the following April. The full press conference announcing that the original logo would be set abandoned can be found on YouTube. ‘Tōkyō gorin enburemu mondai de sohiki inkaika kaiken’. Filmed [September 2015]. YouTube video, 1:44:32. Posted [September 2015]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xd2bmMrk9ss. (Accessed 05.10.2017). The press conference about the new logo is likewise on YouTube: OPTVstaff. ‘Tōkyō gorin enburemu kisha kaiken’. Filmed [April 2016]. YouTube video, 55:54. Posted [April 2016]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lbRFH2791iNc. (Accessed 05.10.2017).


further disillusioned people in Japan.\textsuperscript{5} As a consequence, the prospect of bringing the Olympics back to Tokyo has been met with resistance from the start—most obviously, when its bid for the 2016 summer games failed miserably.

Because of Tokyo’s failed 2016 bid, the second bid for the 2020 games got off to a rough start in 2009. After the triple catastrophe of March 2011, however, support for the Olympic bid became a patriotic duty, at least for a while. The catastrophe, known as 3/11, involved a massive earthquake off the coast of Northern Japan, which caused a devastating tsunami that not only killed nearly 20,000 people but also hit the nuclear power plants of Fukushima. The Japanese government promoted hosting the 2020 Olympic Games as an opportunity for national renewal, and critical voices in the media disappeared. But, as I will show, 3/11 also gave rise to a greater political use of social media in Japan, and this new development in Japan’s media landscape has allowed the anti-Olympic movement to gain a much louder voice in Japan.

At the end of this essay, I will how social media has offered a new forum for criticizing the 2020 Olympics. Activist voices have linked social media up with classic protest movements, which have gathered in the city to demonstrate against the games. Even though the impact of the actual protests is rather small, the information they have made available about the problematic aspects of hosting the games has kept such criticism prominent in public discourse.

The ‘Excellent’ Games 1964

The conventional understanding of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics is that they helped to bring Japan back to the international stage through the perfect showcasing of its capital.\textsuperscript{6} The games broadcast a very convincing story to the world as well as to the Japanese themselves: that Japan had overcome the dark decades, in the catastrophe of two atomic bombs, and was once again an ambitious country striving for economic success. At the same time, Japan also wanted to be accepted into the international community of peaceful and well-respected countries, and the Olympic Games were meant to be a rite of passage for its return. Sakai Yoshinori, the last runner of the Olympic torch relay, embodied these symbolic aspirations. Born on August 6, 1945, the day the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima he represented the rebirth


Continuity or Change: After the Tokyo Olympic Games
1964: Exploring the Tokyo Games 2020 through various Critical Reviews

Tyrel Eskelson

This essay examines the social ‘topography’ of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games by means of various relevant analyses. How do these Games represent twenty-first century Japan? How do they compare with the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games in its representation of Japan in the twentieth century? Furthermore, is there a dialectical relationship in both instances between the Olympics and the Japanese people? The differing views of various media commentators will be considered in this examination of the extent of continuity or change.

Introduction: Modern Sport and the Modern Olympics

Less than a month after winning the 2016 election to become Tokyo’s first female governor, Koike Yuriko traveled to Rio de Janeiro to attend the closing ceremony of the Rio Summer Games. There, the new governess received the Olympic and Paralympic Flags as a representative of the Summer Olympic Games to be held in Tokyo in 2020. During her 2016 campaign, Koike had declared that ‘the Olympics are right in front of us. I want to use them as a chance to build a new Tokyo for beyond 2020’. Cities, and countries, need responsible policies that promote innovation and implement long-term vision for their futures. The Olympics are often seen as a way to boost economic growth. For a city like Tokyo, with modern infrastructure and transportation, why are the Olympic Games used as the answer to Japan’s economic woes?

Pierre de Coubertin, the ‘father’ of the modern Olympics, envisioned an event which espoused the value of pure sport, competition and the ideals of international understanding. However, sport in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is inseparable from the economic, political, and culture aspirations of the nation. This has taken on increased significance in the era of transnational globalisation, but it has been true for several centuries. The historian Tony Collins, writing about 18\textsuperscript{th} century sport, observed, ‘Sport was not merely co-terminous with the expansion of capitalism but an integral part of that expansion, not only in economic organization but also in ideological meaning. At the level of everyday discourse and seemingly empirical “common sense” – what might be termed “deep politics” - modern sport was capitalism at play’.\footnote{Collins, Tony. Sport in Capitalist Society: A Short History. (London and New York: Routledge, 2013): 13.} And as William Tsutsui has observed, as have many others, the modern Olympics are
now woven into complex webs of international geopolitics, economic development, and nation building, the Olympics are heavily freighted with meanings, from the dreams and dramas of individual athletes to national aspirations and civic pride, cultural imperialism and postcolonial resistance, gender disparities and racial inequalities, and a whole host of other ambitions and anxieties played out in medal counts, opening ceremonies, and architectural statements.²

The unrealized 1940 Tokyo Olympics³ and successful 1964 Tokyo Olympics were seen in Japan as a way to demonstrate to the world Japan’s modernization in an effort to overcome negative cultural stereotypes. It is widely accepted that the 1964 Tokyo Olympics were a major success for Japan, allowing them back into the world community of nations. Other East-Asian nations, of course, have used the Olympic Games for this purpose: the 1988 Seoul Olympics and the 2008 Beijing Olympics were largely a means to demonstrate to the world South Korea and China’s respective economic modernity.⁴

Ironically perhaps, in the 21st century, the Olympics are still sought after by developed and developing nations, but are increasingly seen as a major risk economically with good reason. The 1976 Montreal Olympics left the city with 30 years of debt; the 2004 Athens Olympic venues are abandoned white elephants⁵ and the cost of hosting played a role in the Greek Economic crisis; the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics came with a $50 billion price tag. The question of who benefits from the Olympics is an important question increasingly being asked by scholars, governments and people.

Consequently, Tokyo made an official bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics, but suffered from low public support and ultimately lost out to Rio de Janeiro. However, following the calamitous events of March 2011, known in Japan as 3.11, people felt


³ World War II forced the cancellation of the games.


⁵ The large infrastructures appear to be an impressive addition to a cityscape but usually have exorbitant upkeep fees that do not get considered in the pre-Olympic anticipation.
MEDIA, SPORT, NATIONALISM

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it their patriotic duty to support the Olympic bid. Tokyo was awarded the 2020 Summer Olympic Games. Tokyo will become the first East-Asian city to host the games for a second time but the city is a very different place today. This essay will briefly examine Japan’s Olympic history and the hosting of the 1964 Olympics as a means for comparison with the upcoming 2020 Olympics. This comparison with 1964 will allow an examination of its motivations for hosting the 2020 Olympics. In addition, a consideration of the current state of Japanese politics, economics and culture will provide insights into the anticipated legacy of Tokyo 2020. This essay will consider Japan’s modern history using sport as the thread that runs from the late 19th century to the present. The chief argument is that unless Japan achieves a twenty-first century modernization of its economic, political, and social policies, it will not realise a positive legacy in the upcoming Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games.

**Cultural Diffusion: Japan, the British Empire and Sport**

It can be argued that the Meiji Restoration and ‘Opening up’ of Japan to the West was both a positive and negative event in the history of Japan. It was without question a pivotal moment in Japanese history. From a long historical perspective that takes into account how recent imperialism affected individual nations around the globe, Japan is, by most accounts, one of the most successful nations with an advanced, modern society. Japan, as a nation, since the mid-19th century, has attempted to mix valued cultural traditions with the ruthless and competitive demands of the free market world.

As a cultural exporter, Japan has spread its cuisine, martial arts and arts to the world. The balance is tipped though towards the cultural importation of the Western world. Today, Japanese people wear Western suits and blue jeans; eat French, Italian, Indian, and American food; spend most waking hours on an American-designed smart phone; use hundreds of adopted foreign words written in Katakana; and perhaps, the most important cultural importation has been Western sport from England and the United States.

The British Empire reached its zenith in the 19th century and its imperial and foreign policy bolstered its territories to maintain economic and trade advantages. The Empires committed pedagogues, Christian missionaries and public school officials promoted British sport in a sustained process of enculturation. These imperial


7 There are numerous exemplars but arguably one of the most committed, courageous and ultimately successful, was Cecil Earle Tyndale Biscoe. See Chapter 7 of Mangan, J.A. *The Games Ethic and
Is It the Same Olympic Games? Comparison between 1988 Seoul Summer Olympics and 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games

Chang Wan Woo and Mikyung Bae

South Korea hosted the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Seoul and will host the 2018 Winter Games in PyeongChang. Even though the Games are being held in the same country, the circumstances of these two Olympics are quite different. Articles covering both Olympics published in major Korean newspapers during the time period between the announcement of winning the bid to host the Games to one year before the Olympics were analysed. Content analysis of the articles shows that the articles about the PyeongChang Olympics more often mention the host city and its economic struggles, while articles about the Seoul Olympics portrayed the Games as a contributor to world peace.

Introduction

Recent criticism of the Sochi and Rio Olympics and Paralympics include economic and environmental concerns. The Sochi Games damaged Russia’s most environmentally pristine region. The Rio Games failed to receive support from citizens, and some cities including Boston and Hamburg withdrew their bids for the Olympic Games because of criticism from their citizens. Economically, Olympic hosting cities have not had great success with the exception of the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games and the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics. Both cities did not gain any notable economic advantages. Furthermore, after multiple crises including a bribery scandal and performance-enhancing drug use scandals related to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), cities have been less willing to bid to host the Olympic Games. As a result, the expectations related to the Olympic Games have changed.

South Korea hosted the 1988 Seoul Olympics and Paralympics and will host the 2018 Games in PyeongChang. In the 30 years since the Seoul Olympics, South Korea has hosted numerous sports mega-events including the FIFA World Cup in 2002.

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with Japan, two summer Universiades in 2003 and 2015, and three Asian Games in 1986, 2002 and 2014. During those 30 years, South Korea had not changed its constitution. This occurred after constitutional reform in 1987, immediately before the Seoul Olympics. However, the South Korean government is currently discussing constitutional reform once again. South Korea’s per capita income in 1988 was $3,000, but it is expected to surpass $30,000 in 2018, and South Korea was ranked 11th in gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015.

The Seoul Olympics was one of only two Games held in a developing country up until that time. This event impacted on South Korea in many ways. The Olympics made a profit. South Korea expanded its relationships with communist countries and increased its diplomatic power; president Roh Tae Woo, for example, was invited to speak at the United Nation’s (UN) Assembly meeting right after the Seoul Olympics even though South Korea was not a member of the UN until 1991. Unlike recent Olympics that have not been very profitable and as more and more countries increasingly doubt the positive impact of hosting the event, the government of South Korea needed the Games to gain legitimacy for its regime and prove its superiority over North Korea. Circumstances in South Korea now are different to 1988, therefore, the expectations and purposes of the two Olympics in South Korea – 1988 and 2018 – should be different.

Notably, a national identity that is naturally embedded in the Olympic Games has been the most marketable product in modern sport. Sometimes, the media utilize patriotic telecasts on the Olympic Games after the country has experienced a national crisis, such as the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics after the 9/11 terror attack.

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in the U.S. South Korea has been confronted by North Korea since the Korean War, which ended in 1953. The Seoul Olympic Games was Korea’s first global event since 1953. Therefore, it is interesting to consider how news media portrayed the Seoul Olympic Games and to compare that portrayal with the PyeongChang Olympic Games 30 years later.

Therefore, the main purpose of this study was to note if there is any difference in newspaper reporting between the Seoul Olympics and PyeongChang Olympics. Specifically, the intention is in this essay is to investigate how Nationalism and the Olympicism were portrayed via media in the period between the announcement about hosting the Olympics and one year before the Games. First of all, how the Olympics has reflected Nationalism and the spirit of Olympism will be discussed. Then, the economic impact of the Olympics will be reviewed. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the findings.

The Olympic Movement and the Growth of Nationalism

When Baron Pierre de Coubertin revitalized the Olympics in 1896, his reason for doing so was to promote world peace. The original ancient Olympics were mostly used to prepare for wars, as the Greeks at war. The ancient Olympics, of course, were limited to specific cities in Greece; therefore, they were not relevant to world peace. The modern Olympic Games are not preparation for war. The only elements that de Coubertin took from the ancient Olympics were Hellenistic elements of mind and spirit. Coubertin was an admirer of the ethos of British sport and the governing body of the IOC adopted the British concept of ‘imperial’ athleticism, including ‘the spirit of chivalry, fair play, and good government through a games-playing code’. Olympia conceived by de Coubertin convinced the governing body of IOC, and it has safeguarded the Games from other influences.

Modern Olympism was the inspiration for the modern Olympics in 1896. However, the Games quickly became a demonstration of hegemonic intent among the participating countries. It was the Paris Olympics in 1924 when the true spirit of

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13 Ibid.
Korea’s Democratic Movement and the Seoul Olympic Games: Nationalism or Olympic Movement

*Mikyung Bae and Chang Wan Woo*

Even though the Olympic Games has been used to demonstrate nationalism by host countries, the International Olympic Committee still attempts to instill the ideal of internationalism. South Korea was chosen to host the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in 1981. A massive demonstration against the government occurred in 1987. A total of 137 editorials from four major South Korean daily newspapers were analyzed to see how the democratic movement influenced the Seoul Olympics. Analysis of these editorials revealed that democracy and nationalism was viewed differently by the ruling party and the opposition party and that the Olympics unquestionably contributed to the development of democracy in South Korea. Different approaches to democracy were evident in the editorials depending on whether they appeared before the government announced that there would be no constitutional reform, during the massive consequent protests and after the government made a further announcement that it would adopt a fully democratic election process. The South Korean media, specifically in this inquiry four major newspapers, eventually played their part in pressing for true democratic nationalism taking full advantage of the global visibility of the Seoul Olympics as a lever for reform.

Setting the Scene: Politics, Sport, Democracy and East Asia

The government ‘democratic’ reforms announced on 10 June 1987 was only about 15 months before South Korea’s first-ever global mega-event: the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. As one of the few divided countries in the world, the South Korean government wanted to demonstrate to the world its modernity, wealth, efficiency and democracy. However, the South Korean people wanted a more democratic society. A massive democratic protest resulted in Seoul later in 1987 as a response to continued on-going perceived government oppression. The Seoul Olympic and Paralympic Games had been planned since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) announced in September 1981 that Seoul would host the event. The IOC support for Seoul to host the Olympics was strong because the Seoul Olympic Games were not expected to be boycotted by any countries unlike the previous two Olympics hosted at the height of the Cold War (Moscow in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1984). It was predicted that the Seoul Olympic Games would be the most successful Games since the 1964 Tokyo Games as all countries, regardless of their political ideologies,
Sport often reflect politics and related issues. Recent protests against injustice by many players in the U.S. National Football League (NFL) during the national anthem is one example. Other recent examples include also America. After the 9/11 terror attack in the U.S., President George W. Bush encouraged professional sports teams to continue to hold matches to show that fear of terrorism would not keep Americans from living their lives. The professional soccer clubs in Spain, F.C. Barcelona and Athletic Bilbao, have been involved with Catalan and Basque regional and ethnic politics. Very recently, F.C. Barcelona players publicly supported the independence of Catalonia. Sport can also be a microcosm of society. Performers reflect the society they belong to. Not infrequently, some recognize their social responsibilities. For example, Didier Drogba, a former player for England’s Chelsea Football Club, created a foundation that provided financial support for health and education issues in Africa, especially his home country, Ivory Coast. The Nigerian soccer player Nwankwo Kanu contributed to healthcare improvement in Nigeria.

However, hosting an Olympics and Paralympics can be a means of achieving far wider goals such as improving the general infrastructure of host countries- for example, the local Olympic Organizing Committee focused on building a long-lasting legacy after the Vancouver Olympics and Paralympics in 2010. Vancouver, in turn,

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5 Whigham, Stuart and May, Anthony. “‘Sport for Yes?’ The Role of Sporting Issues in Pro-Independence Political Discourse During the Scottish Independence Referendum Campaign”. International Journal of Sport Policy 9, no. 3 (2017): 557-572.
8 Ibid.
10 According to the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) website, the word ‘Paralympic’ derives from the Greek proposition ‘para’ (beside or dalongside) and the word ‘Olympic’ (para. 12).
influenced Canada in terms of social and environmental change.11

This essay examines how an essentially totalitarian system and associated democratic aspirations in South Korea impacted on both the government and people politically as they prepared to host one of the most significant global mega-sports events in 1988. In this impact the media was ultimately influential.

**Olympism and Nationalism**

Sport provides personal, regional and national identity and influences international relations.12 It has been a way of displaying modern national identity since the 1880s when national teams began using anthems, flags and emblems. However, the modern Olympic Games, in turn, is arguably the supreme example of how sport connects athletes from different nations, different ethnic and religious backgrounds and different political ideologies. More than this, the IOC website explains that the Olympic movement’s aims include promoting sport and competition, cooperating with public and private organizations, opposing the commercialism of sport, assisting in developing a ‘Sport for All’ spirit, advancing the participation of women in sport and promoting gender equality, fighting doping, promoting ethics and fair play in sport, raising awareness of environmental issues and supporting developing countries financially and educationally: Olympic ideals. The Olympic and Paralympic Games have become one of the largest sporting supra-national events in the world bringing together not only performers and spectators but also media, governments and businesses with the intention, not always realized, of promoting and achieving these aims and contributing ‘to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport, practised without discrimination of any kind, in a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play’.13 Nationalism, in contrast, can be defined as ‘an abstract ideology that has historically concerned itself with the belief that humanity is divided into nations’.14 Nationalism also include the notion of a people governing themselves and people’s loyalty toward their nation. In summary and ideally, the Olympic Movement

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13 The International Olympic Committee Website. ‘The Organization’. Available at: https://www.olympic.org/about-ioc-institution. (Accessed 07.05.2018).

Seoul 1988: Making of a Nation – the Media and a Mega-Event

Kyoungho Park and Gwang Ok

Arguably the 1988 Seoul Olympics can be regarded as one of the most meaningful events in Olympic history, not to mention the modern history of South Korea. It was the second Games held in a divided nation and in fact, it contributed to softening Cold War tensions, which had lasted for many years. Both the significance and the success of the Games were reported globally by the international media before, during and after the Games. This essay considers the following questions with regards to the Seoul Olympics: how did the global media respond to the undoubted success of both the bidding and hosting of the Games? Did the Games fuse sport and politics together in the media projection of a new global status for South Korea.

Context: The Birth of South Korea

Even during the 18th and 19th centuries, when countries across the world were laying the groundwork for their modernization, Korea still remained a pre-modern dynastic state. Despite the efforts of some pioneers who tried to pursue modernization, Korea needed a significant amount of time to begin to break away from the institutional framework of the Joseon Dynasty that had continued its reign for about 500 years. Korea at that time was attempting modernization. Emperor Gojong (1863–1907), the 26th king of Joseon and the first emperor of Daehanjeguk (Korean Empire) pushed ahead with the reformation of society as a whole focusing on institutional, administrative, legal and educational systems through ‘Gabogaeheyok’ (Gabo Reform of 1894).¹

Unfortunately, however, Korea’s modernization was not completed by the Emperor. The reason: the Japanese imperialist invasion. At the time, Korea was unprepared to resist the political and military occupation by the Japanese. Korea was robbed of its sovereign power by Japan in 1910. The nation suffered under the Japanese for the next 35 years.

Japanese Colonialism

The Japanese colonial era deeply impacted on Korea’s modern history. During the early 20th century, when other countries were constructing their own national frameworks based on their own individual political systems, Korea had to concentrate on the diplomatic, political and military struggles against Japan’s imperialist rule.

Division: North and South

Figure 1 and Figure 2. Early Depictions of the Korean War (1950–1953)

The division of Korea between North and South Korea was the result of the Allied victory in World War II in 1945 ending Japan’s 35-year imperial rule of Korea. The United States and the Soviet Union occupied the country, with the boundary between their zones of control along the 38th parallel. With the onset of the Cold War, negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union failed to lead to an independent, unified Korea. In 1948, UN-supervised elections were held in the US-occupied south only. This led to the establishment of the Republic of Korea in South Korea, which was promptly followed by the establishment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in North Korea. The United States supported the South, the Soviet Union supported the North, and each government claimed sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula. The subsequent Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, ended in stalemate and has left the two Koreas separated by the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) up to the present day.

See also Buzo, Adrian. The Making of Modern Korea. (London: Routledge, 2002).
The approximately forty years between from Japanese colonial rule to the Korean War was a tragic period in Korean history. The Korean War caused five million casualties in both the South and the North, and the nation’s economic foundation was destroyed.

As a result of this devastation, South Korea’s (hence forward to be called Korea) economic condition until the 1960s was dire. The GNP per capita in 1953 right before the Korean War was just US $66. It is therefore impossible to compare the situation at the time with that of the present, in which the per capital GNP of the nation nears US $30,000; it is astonishing to recall that then the nation was one of the world’s poorest countries. Nevertheless, Korea’s rapid economic growth based on socioeconomic development policies such as the Five-Year Economic Development Plans (1962–1981) and the Saemaul Movement from the 1970s resulted in steady and astounding economic growth.

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5 The First Five-Year Plan, from 1962 to 1966, reflected fundamental economic strategies and the annual economic growth target was 7.1 percent: 1) to develop energy supply, including electric power and coal; 2) to make an increase in agricultural production and in farmers’ income; 3) to expand important industries and social overhead capital; 4) to improve the balance of payments by the expansion of internal trades; 5) to promote utilisation of manpower and national land conserva-
tion; 6) to support technological advancement. South Korean government launched this economic development plan and made an annual average economic growth of 7.8 percent in the first five year, from 1962 to 1966, of 9.7 percent in the second, from 1967 to 1971, of 10.1 percent in the third, from 1972 to 1976, 5.6 percent in the fourth, from 1977 to 1981. The annual economic growth rate was 8 percent during the 20 years’ economic development. See Bak, Jin-hwan, ‘Modernisation and Economical Principle of the President Jeong-hi Bak [Bak Jeong-hi Dae-tong-ryeong-ui Geun-dae-

6 Saemaul Movement was launched in 1970 by President Park Jung Hee. It was the key program in the country’s long-term economic development initiative implemented.
Programming China’s Image through the Beijing Olympics: A Comparison of Chinese and Taiwanese Television Broadcasts of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening Ceremony

Florian Schneider

The Beijing Olympic Games and their opening ceremony were of paramount importance to the People’s Republic of China, both as a means of showcasing the increased economic, political, and cultural relevance of the country to a domestic audience and as a vehicle for countering suspicions abroad about a potential ‘China Threat’. This chapter examines what kind of strategies the organizers in Beijing adopted to retain discursive control over the event in a complex media environment characterized by a multitude of actors with diverging interests and communication capacities. It critically discusses the Chinese leadership’s focus on ‘soft power’ and examines how the authorities integrated various actors into a networked process of discourse production and dissemination. The chapter analyses how the event relayed political meanings, and it compares the mainland telecast with broadcasts in Taiwan. It finds that the organizers were able to infuse wider communication networks with particular common-sense truths, which Taiwanese broadcasters generally integrated into their narratives, indirectly promoting a positive image of the PRC to Taiwanese audiences.

Introduction

When the opening ceremony of the 29th Olympic Games began at 8:08 pm on 8 August 2008 in Beijing, the world was witnessing far more than merely a sports event. To the Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the Beijing Olympic Games and their opening ceremony were of paramount importance to the People’s Republic of China (PRC); they provided an opportunity to legitimate the state by showcasing ‘the glory of state power in China’s harmonious society’ to a domestic audience.1 Simultaneously, they promised to counter suspicions abroad about a potential ‘China Threat’ by presenting the country to foreign audiences as a ‘benign, harmony-seeking China emerging as a powerful yet positive global force’.2 In short, the Beijing Olympics were a highly political mass media event.

As students of the Olympic Movement have pointed out, and as the contributions in this volume show, the Games were never solely about sports. From the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896 to the present day, the Olympic Spirit has

been loaded with political meanings,\textsuperscript{3} and these politics have forcefully extended to modern East Asian contexts.\textsuperscript{4} In Japan, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics were a watershed moment in the country’s post-war reconstruction that signalled to the international community that the State of Japan had moved on from its wartime past and was ready to be a member of the international community.\textsuperscript{5} In 1988, South Korea attempted to follow Japan’s example by hosting the Olympic Games in its capital Seoul, and the PRC leadership seems to have at least implicitly modelled its approach to international mass events on Japan’s example as well. As Wasserstrom writes:

China’s leaders might have, at least in private, considered the Tokyo 1964/Beijing 2008 analogy compelling on several levels - even if their suspicion of a historic adversary (and present competitor) made them reluctant to voice this sentiment openly. China, too, had been rapidly climbing the global economic hierarchy and wanted to move higher still. (…) China’s own modern history had seen moments of such destructive extremism (the Great Leap Forward) and defeat (Japanese invasions in the 1930s) that, by 2008, it had good reason to want to put those experiences far behind it.\textsuperscript{6}

Events like Olympic Games offer organizers the opportunity to showcase their relevance on the world stage in a widely accepted and shared international format. It is a mark of honour and respect to be awarded the chance to host one of these prestigious events, and host cities and countries use such occasions to boost their own ‘brand’. Indeed, as one of the organizers of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony explained to me a year after the Games (interview in Beijing, August 2009), the team of marketing experts and project managers who planned the massive media spectacle had been clear from the start about what their task should be: ‘branding the Chinese nation’.

For the Chinese organizers, it was clear that this was a monumental task. It required a clear message that remained in line with directives from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while at the same time appealing to diverse audiences at home and abroad. The various controversies that had engulfed the Beijing Games in their run-up, and the inability of the leadership to define the agenda and frame the event


in ways beneficial to their interest, made this a daunting endeavour.\footnote{Brownell, Susan. “‘Brand China’ in the Olympic Context: Communications Challenges of China’s Soft Power Initiative”. Javnost – The Public, Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture 20, no. 4 (2013): 65–82.} The organizers in Beijing would have to retain discursive control over the event in an international media environment characterized by a multitude of actors with diverging interests and communication capacities. What kind of strategy did the organizers adopt, and what can we learn from their efforts with regards to political communication during mass media events?

To answer these questions, this chapter will analyse how the authorities in the PRC relied on a network of party, state, and societal actors, at home and abroad, to create the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony and invite particular interpretations as the event was broadcast. I will first discuss a prominent concept that is frequently used to make sense of such PR efforts: the idea of ‘soft power’. I will argue that while the concept indeed strongly informs the ideological backdrop of the Beijing Olympics’ public relations campaign, it has limited analytical value when explaining how this campaign worked. Instead, I propose a political communications framework that treats the Beijing Olympic Games as an example of networked politics.

Following this brief conceptual discussion, the chapter then examines how the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony was designed and broadcast in the PRC. The information in this section is based on interviews with organizers of the ceremony, conducted in August 2009, as well as on data drawn from the official Opening Ceremony Media Guide and Opening Ceremony Programme, which the organizers at the Beijing Olympics Committee for the Olympic Games, or BOCOG, had assembled.\footnote{BOCOG. Games of the XXIX Olympiad Opening Ceremony Media Guide. (Beijing: The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, 2008); BOCOG. Official Programme – Opening Ceremony of the Games of the XXIX Olympiad. (Beijing: The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad, 2008).} The chapter then leaves the mainland and explores how Taiwanese television relayed the political discourses embedded in the event. To this end, I analyse how two ideologically competing television stations broadcast the ceremony: the conservative pan-blue China Television (中国电视, or CTV) and the liberal pan-green Formosa Television (民间全民电视, or FTV). Methodologically, the study examines how the visual materials provided by the official broadcaster were reworked and framed by the two Taiwanese TV stations, and how this compared to the broadcast available in the PRC via the mainland’s national station China Central Television (中国中央电视台, or CCTV). The analysis is based on shot-by-shot protocols\footnote{Iedema, Rick. ‘Analysing Film and Television: A Social Semiotic Account of Hospital: an Unhealthy Business’. In Van Leeuwen, Theo and Jewitt, Carey. (eds.) Handbook of Visual Analysis. (Los Angeles et al.: Sage, 2001): 183-206.} that list the images
Soft Power Projection via the Olympic Games: Sport as Geopolitical Diplomacy

Paul Michael Brannagan and Jonathan Grix

Numerous studies have sought to analyse states’ use of sport as part of their foreign policy strategies and goals. Recently, the concept of ‘soft power’ has entered the academic lexicon, adding a sharper edge to analysis and to sport’s role in projecting state prestige, attempts at bringing about global peace and fostering greater positive state-to-state relationships. Coined by Joseph Nye, the concept of ‘soft power’ has grown in prominence in studies in International Relations and more recently has been adopted by a plethora of Sport Studies scholars. Broadly defined as the ability to get what you want through attraction as opposed to coercion, soft power has become a foremost conceptual tool explaining why states engage with sport and more specifically seek to acquire first- and second-order sports mega-events. This essay looks to achieve three things: first it ‘unpacks’ both the origins and mechanisms of the concept of soft power; second, it reviews how and where soft power has been applied to the study of sport mega-events; and finally, it specifically considers Asia where the concept is useful in seeking to explain the political use of sports mega-events.

Introduction

It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the powerful reach and impact of globalization has become a dominant feature of many twenty-first century societies. Despite academic debates and differences concerning globalization’s chronology, one thing that is certain is that ever increasing developments in communications technologies have been a central feature in bringing individuals and societies closer together.¹ Such advances have also allowed information to cross the globe more cheaply and quickly than in previous generations, which, in turn, has led to the growing need for national leaders to pay greater thought and attention to both their own, and their nation’s, image, credibility and reputation. Politics has, therefore, more than ever, become a game of reputation management.² It is because of this that the concept of soft power - briefly defined as ‘the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’ – is now widely considered to be a powerful tool in explaining modern-day global politics.³

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As we go on to argue, the rising importance attached to projecting a positive image has, in-part, made sports mega-events (SMEs) an ever-more sought-after commodity for national leaders across the globe. As communications technologies have advanced, global media coverage of sporting mega-events have reached unprecedented heights, meaning sporting success, through athletic victory and/or effective event hosting, have come to significantly contribute towards states’ desire to secure international recognition, cement their acceptance amongst mature countries, improve their image, or attract others by demonstrating their existing economic, political, social and/or cultural superiority. In short, these events have become a central component to an increasingly vast number of contemporary leaders’ soft power ambitions.

In this chapter we look to examine the soft power capacity of these events in more detail. The following is organized into four section. First, we provide readers with a more thorough examination on the origins and mechanisms underlying the concept of soft power. Second, we shed further light on the role of SMEs in acquiring - and in some cases depriving - states of soft power gains. Third, we highlight the example of Beijing’s staging of the 2008 Olympic Games, focusing in particular on the soft power strategies and outcomes surrounding the event. We conclude by suggesting that East Asia is set to become one of the most prominent hosts of SMEs globally.

**The Concept of ‘Soft Power’: Origins and Mechanisms**

Numerous studies have sought to analyse states’ use of sport as part of their foreign policy strategies and goals. Most recently the concept of ‘soft power’ has entered the academic lexicon, adding a sharper edge to analysis and - we argue - to sport’s role in projecting state prestige, attempts at bringing about global peace and fostering greater positive state-to-state relationships. The concept of ‘soft power’ has grown in prominence in the broad academic field of International Relations and more recently has been adopted by a plethora of Sport Studies scholars, although a clear definition of what it is, how it functions, which mechanisms are involved or whether it can be ‘created’ remain contentious. The concept of ‘soft power’ was coined in 1990 by the American political scientist, Joseph Nye and broadly refers to one’s ability to

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‘effect the outcomes you want, and, if necessary, to change the behaviour of others to make this happen’.\footnote{Nye, Joseph S. ‘The Information Revolution and American Soft Power’. \textit{Asia-Pacific} Review 9, no. 1 (2002): 60-76.} This is looked upon as an alternative to ‘hard power’, that is, traditional elements of coercion and force backed up by military means. According to Keohane and Nye,\footnote{Keohane and Nye, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’.} modern-day leaders seek to obtain their desired political outcomes through a combination of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power strategies; on the former, leaders may, for example, exploit forms of ‘hard power’ via deploying military force or through the offering of economic incentives; in contrast, in the case of the latter, leaders may, however, indirectly adapt the political agenda in such a way that shapes the preferences of others through the emulation of one’s attractive culture, innovative ideologies and/or credible, legitimate and effective values and policies.\footnote{Nye, Joseph S. ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’. \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 119, no. 2 (2004): 255-270.} It is this latter approach – the evidential desire and ability of national leaders ‘to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion’ - which Keohane and Nye denote as ‘soft power’\footnote{Keohane and Nye. ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, 98.}.

Readers should not, however, perceive the concept of soft power to be in direct opposition to hard power forms. In fact, as Nye has argued time and again, national leaders should, whenever possible, endeavour to combine the soft dimension of attraction with the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement (what Nye terms ‘smart power’\footnote{Nye, Joseph S. “a Think Again: Soft Power’. \textit{Foreign Policy}, 23 February 2006. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power. (Accessed 12.01.2016).}). Rather, Nye merely advocates that, in the contemporary epoch, comprised largely of mass-information exchange, nation-states should take greater advantage of the former.\footnote{Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’.} Nye’s provides three foremost reasons for this. First, since the end of the Cold War, nation-states have become far more concerned with forms of welfare over military glory, whereby, in the modern era, national leaders need greater public support before engaging in forceful pursuits. Second, for the majority of powers, the use of force severely jeopardises their economic objectives and ability to maintain international competitiveness. Finally, the increasing influence of the information revolution and globalisation has led to states’ behaviour coming under closer scrutiny than ever before. The result is that the use of force has become less tolerated in post-industrial (and, in particular, advanced capitalist) societies, leading to the increasing significance of soft power strategies.\footnote{Nye, ‘The Information Revolution and American Soft Power’; Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’.}
The Beijing Olympics: Retrospective Reflection on the Impact of the Global Media

Susan Brownell

This essay reflects on the Beijing Olympic Games as a strategy of public diplomacy and from the perspective of “soft power.” It evaluates the impact of China’s global projection of a national image in the nine years following the event. In so doing, it demonstrates changes not only in China’s national image, but also analyzes the media impact of Olympic Games and of the international reportage on China and the Olympics. The conclusion is that the impact of the Olympic Games on national image, and of the Beijing Olympics on China’s national image, is complex and cannot be reduced to a single vector. However, the increasing influence of human rights NGOs and their savvy influence over media coverage probably helped to shape the message that surrounded the Beijing Olympics with some overall negative impact on China’s national image.

From their inception in 1896 through the end of the Cold War, the primary function of the modern Olympics in global society was as a vehicle of diplomacy between nations that were often hostile towards each other, or even that were in the midst of military confrontations. The end of the Cold War decreased the emphasis on conventional inter-state diplomacy and increased the emphasis on public diplomacy, i.e. the attempt by governments to circumvent foreign governments and directly communicate with the citizens of other countries. This means that the IOC is no longer primarily mediating only between governments of hostile nations, but rather is mediating between a complex array of actors that includes the government of the host city, multiple national governments, multiple agencies of the United Nations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the international media. The Beijing Olympics Games in 2008 took place amidst this period of transition for the IOC and the world order. Moreover, the fact that the Olympics took place in China – seen as a rising superpower on the verge of challenging the supremacy of Western culture and civilization – strengthened the sense of a changing political balance.

Soft Power

In addition to this global trend, within the region of East Asia, the competition for ‘soft power’ had grown ever more heated. In the 1980s and 1990s the ‘New Confucianists’ began to explore the ways in which the Confucian heritage united East Asia as a world region and made it distinct from the cultural West in important ways. The Korean military dictatorship of the 1980s somewhat accidentally discovered the strategy of using popular culture to calm social unrest; domestic critics called that
policy the ‘3S policy’ – ‘sex, sports, and screen’ – referring to the loosening of controls on pornography and the promotion of movies and sports. Over time, the 3S policy evolved and became more sophisticated. The 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul added an international orientation to Korean cultural policies. In the mid to late 1990s, this coalesced into the government-led promotion of ‘cultural industries’ in both Korea and Japan when K-pop began to eclipse J-pop and the Japanese government responded with greater investments and attention to the culture industries. In 2004, Joseph Nye’s *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* argued that ‘soft power’ – co-option and attraction – were becoming increasingly important in international relations, while ‘hard power’ – the use of military coercion and economic incentives and sanctions – was becoming less important. Nye’s idea was picked up by public relations firms working for the Beijing Olympics. In February 2007, Joshua Cooper Ramo, a former Foreign Editor of *Time Magazine* and then a partner at Kissinger Associates, wrote a report entitled *Brand China* funded by Hill & Knowlton, which was working for the Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee (BOCOG) at the time. He suggested that thinking about China as if it were a ‘brand’ might help China communicate a clearer image of itself. (Ramo would later serve as the expert commentator for NBC television’s broadcast of the Olympic opening ceremonies.) Eight months later, President Hu Jintao named strengthening China’s soft power in his address to the 17th Party Congress, making the pursuit of soft power an official policy. The question of how to use the Olympic Games to improve China’s national image became a widely-debated topic inside China and the government funded research on it. A key policy recommendation in a government-funded report by Renmin University advocated that ‘culture’ should occupy the central role in the effort to shape China’s national image using the 2008 Olympics as a platform.

In sum, today East Asia as a region has a distinctive emphasis on ‘soft power’ in international relations, which other parts of the world are starting to imitate. Certainly the East Asian pursuit of soft power is both a result of the experiences gained in the past Olympic Games, and a reason that, starting in 2018, three consecutive

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